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Abstract. Deconstruction of the theme of the 2017 FQXi essay contest is already an
interesting exercise in its own right: Teleology is rarely useful in physics — the only
known mainstream physics example (black hole event horizons) has a very mixed score-
card — so the “goals” and “aims and intentions” alluded to in the theme of the 2017
FQXi essay contest are already somewhat pushing the limits. Furthermore, “aims and
intentions” certainly carries the implication of consciousness, and opens up a whole
can of worms related to the mind-body problem. As for “mindless mathematical laws”,
that allusion is certainly in tension with at least some versions of the “mathematical
universe hypothesis”. Finally “wandering towards a goal” again carries the implication
of consciousness, with all its attendant problems.
In this essay I will argue, simply because we do not yet have any really good
mathematical or physical theory of consciousness, that the theme of this essay contest
is premature, and unlikely to lead to any resolution that would be widely accepted in
the mathematics or physics communities.
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quantum; teleology; ontology; epistemology.
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Essay written for the FQXi 2017 essay contest: “Wandering towards a goal:
How can mindless mathematical laws give rise to aims and intention?”
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1. Introduction
The theme of the 2017 FQXi essay contest is this: “Wandering towards a goal: How
can mindless mathematical laws give rise to aims and intention?” This is certainly an
extremely interesting question, but as several other contributors have pointed out —
there are an awful lot of assumptions built into the way the question is phrased, and
in attempting to answer this question it would seem unlikely that any generally agreed-
upon community-wide consensus could be reached. The question touches on teleology,
on emergence, (the sum is greater than its parts), on the problem of consciousness, and
can even be argued to be connected to the collapse of the wavefunction in quantum
physics.
2. Teleology
Black hole event horizons in general relativity are teleological; one has to wait till the
trump of doom, and then back-track from the infinite future, to know whether or not an
event horizon is present right now [1]. Black hole event horizons can form in portions
of flat spacetime, and sneak up on one unexpectedly, with zero warning [1]. There is no
finite-resource experiment that any physicist could possibly perform to unambiguously
detect the presence or absence of an event horizon [1]. In contrast apparent/trapping
horizons are not teleological, and their presence or absence can, (at least for spherical
horizons in spherically symmetric spacetimes), be unambiguously detected by finite-
resource experiments, using quasi-local (ie, finite volume) measurements of tidal and
related effects [1]. So in a very precise Popperian sense, event horizons are simply not
physics, while apparent/trapping horizons certainly are physics.
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So why has so much attention been paid to event horizons over the last 50 years?
Simply put, event horizons make it possible to prove nice general mathematical
theorems, whereas the apparent/trapping horizon variants of those theorems are much
trickier and subject to qualifying technical conditions. (This is not just technical
quibbling, there is real physics hiding the event horizon versus apparent/trapping
horizon distinction [2, 3, 4].) Even Stephen Hawking has now abjured event horizons,
not once but at least twice [5, 6]. Initially he did so at the Dublin meeting in 2004 [5]:
The way the information gets out seems to be that a true event horizon never
forms, just an apparent horizon.
More recently in 2014 Hawking asserted [6]:
The absence of event horizons means that there are no black holes — in the
sense of regimes from which light can’t escape to infinity. There are, however,
apparent horizons which persist for a period of time.
So teleology in physics has a very mixed score-card — the only known mainstream
physics example is black hole event horizons, but while event horizons are certainly
mainstream (sociological) physics, it is much less certain that they are mainstream
(scientific) physics — certainly event horizons fail Popper falsifiability, while apparent/
trapping horizons are perfectly acceptable science in Popper’s sense.
Again, I emphasize that these are not just technical quibbles — the confusion regarding
event horizons versus apparent/trapping horizons lies at the heart of the so-called
“information paradox” associated with black hole evaporation, which is not in any
sense a paradox when viewed in terms of Popperian-appropriate apparent/trapping
horizons [4]. The firewall argument simply dissolves when viewed in terms of Popperian-
appropriate apparent/trapping horizons [4].
The relevance to the current essay topic is that, in the one place that teleological ideas
have (sociologically) become part of mainstream physics, ultimately they have really
not panned out all that well, leading to decades of unnecessary confusion.
3. Emergence
Emergence (the sum is greater than its parts) in theoretical physics is a tricky word.
There are only four real physics examples where this word makes some sort of sense:
• Molecular dynamics =⇒ fluid dynamics (truncation of the BBKY hierarchy).
• Molecular dynamics =⇒ continuum solid elasticity theory.
• Phase transitions (discontinuities that only exist in the infinite volume limit).
• Jacobson-style thermodynamic emergent gravity.
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Now even Jacobson-style thermodynamic emergent gravity [7] is subject to some minor
technical qualifications [8]. (In contrast Verlinde-style entropic gravity [9] was developed
some 15 years later, is non-relativistic, and cannot even successfully handle the 2-body
problem [10].)
Emergence, (in the sense of Anderson’s “more is different” [11]), certainly applies to (and
is useful in) some branches of physics, but, (and this the point for current purposes),
emergence is a concept that should be used with extreme care and discretion. When
used carelessly, the word emergence degenerates into nothing more than the Stalinist
aphorism “quantity has a quality all of its own”.
4. Consciousness
The problem of consciousness (somewhat roughly) equates to the Descartes mind-body
problem: Is the mind a distinct physical entity, or is it merely an epiphenomenon,
somehow emergent from the physics of the brain? Bluntly speaking, we do not yet
know enough to give any meaningful answer to this question. We may have opinions,
maybe even strong opinions, on this issue — but given what we know, (rather than
what we might like to believe), the whole mind-body problem is still in a state of highly
inconclusive emotional venting, it does not yet rise to the level of a scientific debate.
The relevance to the current essay topic is this: The theme of the essay contest
implicitly appeals to consciousness (be it human or otherwise) to even define “aims” or
“intentions”, and the fact that we simply do not have a coherent physical understanding
of the ontology of consciousness, let alone the details of the physical mechanism by which
consciousness might arise, rather undermines the whole theme of the essay contest. We
do not even have a good epistemology (a coherent framework of more or less well defined
and widely agreed upon experimental protocols) by which we could address this issue.
This is not to say that valiant attempts are not being made in addressing the problem
of consciousness, see for instance three books by Roger Penrose [12, 13, 14], but it is
fair to say that there is no widely and generally accepted resolution of the problem of
consciousness.
5. Collapse of the wave-function
The quite mainstream Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics holds a
special place for the somewhat ill-defined “observer”, whose measurements are asserted
to “collapse the wavefunction” [15]. More radical Wigner-like [16] variants of the
Copenhagen interpretation argue for the centrality of human consciousness in the
collapse process. The Wigner’s friend argument asks this: If Wigner has a friend who
undertakes the actual measurement/observation, for definiteness in a Schro¨dinger’s cat
experiment [17], does the friend collapse the wavefunction, or is wavefunction collapse
postponed until the results are communicated to Wigner?
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Let me ask something significantly more pointed: What if Wigner’s friend is a dog?
Is dog-level consciousness, observing some quantum phenomenon, sufficient to provoke
wave-function collapse. Just what level of consciousness is required for collapse? Is cat-
level consciousness sufficient? (Worse, are we really sure that human-level consciousness
is sufficient? The theologians might wish to speculate on direct angelic or demonic
intervention being required to collapse the wave-function, I will steer well clear of that
particular mess.) With any degree of safety and certainty we can only conclude this:
There is something very rotten in the eigenstate of Schro¨dinger’s cat.
As for other popular interpretations of quantum mechanix, it is important to realise
that decoherence is not enough. Decoherence at best reduces quantum amplitudes
to classical probabilities. But decoherence by itself does not reify (make real) any
unique experimental outcome. Decohering Schro¨dinger’s cat at best leads to 50%–50%
classically alive/dead cat, at least no longer in a quantum superposition, but one still
needs an observer to record a definite outcome.
Many-worldism has its own issues. The original Everett variant of many-worldism
treated the wave-function as a representation of our state of ignorance [18], (essentially as
a quantum variant of Jaynes’ classical maximum entropy principle [19, 20, 21, 22]). More
modern variants of many-worldism somewhat vaguely invoke (human?) consciousness
— with the minds of conscious entities constantly dividing down the infinitely branching
yggdrasillian world-tree of future possibilities. (And, if you take the path-integral
approach seriously, a merging world-tree of past possibilities.)
More subtly, one one tries to make branching universe scenarios relativistic, one seems
to have to deal with non-Hausdorff manifolds; with universes splitting along the future
light cones of quantum measurement events, or worse.
Again, the relevance to this essay is simply this: The major interpretations of quantum
mechanix, one way or another, depend on developing an ontology and epistemology
of consciousness — and this is one reason why progress on this topic is frustratingly
difficult [23, 24]. (The fiendishly difficult nature of the relevant experiments is not
entirely helpful either.) Without a coherent theoretical structure to work in, the
thematic “aims and intentions” of this essay contest are too imprecise for useful progress.
6. Thinking meat
We are, all of us homo sapiens, simply and literally, just thinking meat. Whether
we are more than thinking meat can (for the time being) be left to the philosophers
and religious advocates; the physics community simply does not (yet) have appropriate
techniques to have anything substantive to say on this issue. Conversely when it comes
to “mindless mathematics”, one must consider this: Can mathematics exist without a
mind to formulate it?
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This question cuts to the heart of the Platonist–Intuitionist–Constructivist debate in
the philosophy of mathematics. (There are at least half-a-dozen other variants on these
themes, I am simplifying [25].) Again we see issues of mind, and implicitly consciousness,
being dragged kicking and screaming into the discussion. (Or maybe it is the disputants
being dragged kicking and screaming into the contemplation of the need for a physical
ontology and epistemology of consciousness and the mind-body problem.)
7. Conclusions
In summary, the way the theme for the 2017 FQXi essay contest has been phrased, one
simply has no choice but to confront issues of teleology, ontology, and epistemology —
and specifically consciousness and the mind-body problem. What is truly frustrating
for the mathematics and physics communities, is that we do not (yet) have any suitable
and appropriate well-agreed-upon mathematical/physical framework to address these
issues. In view of this circumstance, potential resolutions of the question raised in the
theme for this essay contest are unlikely (at this stage) to gain widespread support
within the mathematics and physics communities. Do not give up on asking these
questions, but do take cognizance of the fact that these questions are hard ; facile
answers will simply not be sufficient. In some circles, it has recently become popular to
make snide comments concerning the Popperati; but remember this — whatever one’s
views on Popper’s falsifiability criterion, it is certainly a very pragmatic and useful way
of focussing attention on those ideas and techniques that are most likely to lead to
interesting and widely-accepted results.
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